The latest Office of Inspector General report found that TSA failed to clearly define law enforcement roles for its program offices, causing internal conflicts and tension between TSA’s LE/FAMS ITS and TSA Investigations regarding the referral and investigation of misconduct allegations. Furthermore, ITS did not consistently refer or coordinate with TSA Investigations on cases involving alleged employee misconduct, as required. DHS issued six recommendations to TSA to clarify law enforcement roles and enhance collaboration between LE/FAMS ITS and TSA Investigations. TSA agreed with all six recommendations.
“Based on our analysis of 177 case records, we found ITS did not refer to TSA Investigations 21 allegations of criminal misconduct involving TSA employees that originated from sources available to both offices. Of those 21 non-referrals, ITS opened a case on 12 allegations to gather additional information without coordinating with TSA Investigations.”

VIEW THE FULL REPORT AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS STORY
“Insider Threat Section (ITS) did not have an approved, documented standard operating procedure or a formalized training plan to ensure ITS’ personnel process and refer allegations of TSA employee misconduct consistently.”
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TSA failed to clearly designate responsibility for insider threat investigations, resulting in conflicts between the Insider Threat Section (ITS) and TSA Investigations over authority, which caused delays in handling critical cases.

Despite operating for ten years, the Insider Threat Section lacks approved standard operating procedures. Staff training is insufficient, with only 45% of recorded courses verifiable, and some personnel investigating insider threats lack proper training in identifying espionage, sabotage, or terrorism indicators.
Here’s what happened when it comes to the security risk:
Insider threats, such as corrupt or compromised TSA employees, could evade security systems without detection.
Inadequate investigations allow criminal behavior within TSA to go unaddressed.
Gaps in oversight heighten the risk of terrorism, smuggling, or sabotage for travelers.
Turf conflicts between TSA offices leave the American public exposed to vulnerabilities.
The conclusion of the report shows that TSA's internal shortcomings jeopardize aviation security. Unless Congress enforces accountability and TSA adopts the OIG’s recommendations, insider threats and security breaches will continue to endanger the flying public.